Abstract: When the Internet was in its nascency, the Federal Communications Commission rejected calls to impose traditional "common carrier" regulation designed for a monopoly telephone world. Instead, the agency classified broadband Internet access as an "information service" under Title I of the Communications Act, and this light touch approach is widely credited with the rapid pace of deployment, adoption, and innovation consumers enjoy today in the broadband ecosystem. With the Federal Communications Commission's efforts to move forward with the IP Transition and with its new attempt to draft legally-sustainable Open Internet Rules, some now argue that the current legal regime fails to provide the Commission with sufficient oversight authority and, as such, the Commission should reclassify broadband Internet access as a Title II common carrier "telecommunications" service. In an effort to provide some illumination to this important topic, in this BULLETIN I review three recent cases from the D.C. Circuit-Comcast v. FCC, Cellco Partnership v. FCC and Verizon v. FCC- www.phoenix-center.org
I. Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has a long and distinguished history of applying a light regulatory touch to nascent technologies that can, and often do, disrupt the status quo (see, e.g., the FCC's successful Competitive Carrier paradigm for long distance service). 1 Consistent with this precedent, as the Internet began to emerge as an alternative platform to traditional telecommunications services, the agency again had the foresight to apply a light regulatory touch.
What is interesting to note is the Commission's choice of legal theories under which it decided to pursue its deregulatory strategy for broadband. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 offered the Commission two broad paths: 2 First, the Commission could have tried to regulate broadband Internet access using a "light touch" form of Title II common carrier-style regulation by utilizing its authority under Section 10 of the 1996 Act to forbear from select portions of the Communications Act. 3 While this approach was contemplated over the years, both Democrat and Republican administrations soundly rejected this path. As the Clinton-era FCC observed in 1998, "classifying Internet access services as telecommunications services could have significant consequences for the global development of the Internet. We recognize the unique qualities of the Internet, and do not presume that legacy regulatory frameworks are appropriately applied to it." 4 Indeed, there are several fundamental legal and policy problems with such an approach: For example, as the Commission itself noted, this approach would foist a host of legacy regulations designed for a monopoly telephone world (including state regulation) immediately upon the Internet-a policy which on its face makes little sense, not to mention its inconsistency with Commission precedent of applying de minimis regulation on nascent technologies. 5 Second, the agency's use 1 Non-Dominant Carrier, FCC 95-427, 11 FCC Rcd. 3271 (1995) and citations therein. 2 Indeed, it should be noted that prior to the enactment of the 1996 Act, the Communications Act did not contain any provisions that would expressly allow the agency to forbear lawfully from applying portions of the Act. Thus, for example, when the FCC tried to eliminate tariff requirements for non-dominant long-distance carriers, the Supreme Court held that the agency lacked this authority. See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994 of its Section 10 forbearance authority has a sordid past, and the agency's latest theory of forbearance-set forth in its Phoenix Forbearance Order-effectively neuters Section 10 as a plausible deregulatory tool. 6 More importantly, for such a "light touch" common carrier approach to work effectively, the FCC must maintain a sufficient level of credibility for "regulatory self-restraint" with both the industry and financial markets to preserve investment incentives-a credibility which is tenuous at best. 7 Instead, the Commission classified broadband Internet access as an "information service" 8 under Title I and decided to impose regulation (as necessary) under its long-standing "ancillary authority." 9 Not only did such an approach avoid applying legacy regulations to the Internet, but had the added benefit of effectively preempting state public utility commissions from regulating broadband. 10 The Commission eventually classified everything from cable broadband, 11 wireline broadband, 12 wireless broadband 13 Notwithstanding the benefits of the agency's deregulatory approach for broadband, some parties are concerned that the current legal regime fails to provide the Commission with sufficient authority over broadband Internet services to protect consumers 16 and, as such, the Commission should solidify its authority by reclassifying broadband Internet service as a Title II common carrier telecommunications service. 17  Second, these cases hold that the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction over Broadband Service Providers remains alive and well, provided that the Commission ties the use of that jurisdiction to a specific delegation of authority under Title II, Title III or Title VI. In this sense, nothing has changed. So, while ancillary authority remains a potent and legally-sound tool in the Commission's regulatory arsenal to remedy policy-relevant harms, especially on a case-by-case basis, the agency must provide its whys-andwherefores to the court.
See, e.g., In re Motion of AT&T Corp. to Be Reclassified as a
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Significantly, the Supreme Court recently strengthened the Chevron Doctrine to give the Commission-as the "expert agency"-great deference to interpret the Communications Act in the digital age. See City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S.Ct. 1863 (2013 Given that national security and law enforcement issues are often governed by other statutes (e.g., CALEA) which have a "wholly distinct legislative history and Congressional purpose" from that of the Communications Act, see, e.g., Time Warner Telecom v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205, Cir. 2007) , any discussion about how the Commission's decision to classify broadband Internet access as an information service impacts the FCC's authority to comply with these type of statutes is beyond the scope of this paper.  Finally, these cases make clear that because the Commission classified broadband as a Title I information service, the Commission is prohibited by statute from imposing traditional Title II common carrier obligations on BSPs. 25 That is, the agency may not regulate broadband Internet access using the traditional "unjust and unreasonable" or "undue discrimination" standards of Title II. However, these cases also hold that the FCC may regulate the conduct of BSPs under a "commercially reasonable" standard, which, the courts reasoned, permits individualized transactions and is thus sufficiently different from common carrier regulation to be lawful. That said, evaluation of any new "commercially reasonable" standard will be contingent on "how the common carrier reasonableness standard applies in … context, not whether the standard is actually the same as the common carrier standard."
To explore this important topic in detail, this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I summarize and analyze each of the three cases mentioned above. Conclusions are set forth in the final section.
II. The Case Law
In this section, I review three recent cases from the D.C. In Comcast, the D.C. Circuit was confronted with the FCC's first formal attempt to address the network management practices of broadband service providers, 26 an effort for which the Commission conceded it lacked any express jurisdiction to do. 27 As such, the central legal issue in Comcast revolved around the question of whether the Commission could exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to regulate such practices. 28 At bottom, while the court answered this question in the affirmative, it found that in this particular case the agency had failed to provide an adequate justification to warrant the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction.
In its analysis of the law, the court looked at two types of statutes upon which the Commission relied: (1) statements of Congressional policy; and (2) statutory provisions which purport to provide a grant of direct responsibility. Let's look at how the court viewed each category under the particular facts of this case below.
Statements of Congressional Policy
Like many pieces of legislation, the Communications Act is replete with Congressional statements of policy expressing this desire or another. 29 In this particular case, however, the court focused on the FCC's use of policy statements contained in Section 230(b) 30 See, e.g., the preamble of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which provides that the Act is intended "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition." Conference Report, Telecommunications Act of 1996, House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 2d Session, H. Rpt. 104-458, at p. 1. In fact, reasoned the court, not only was the Commission's use of policy statements inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, "but, if accepted it would virtually free the Commission from its Congressional tether." 33 Ancillary authority, the court reiterated, must be tied to a specific delegation of authority in Title II, Title III, or Title VI.
Specific Delegations of Authority
As noted in the preceding discussion, the court announced that it was amenable to arguments that the Commission could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over Broadband Service Providers, so long as the Commission articulates a clear nexus to a specific grant of authority found somewhere in Titles II, III, or VI of the Communications Act. In this particular case, because of both substantive and procedural infirmities, the court ruled that the Commission did not meet this requirement. I describe three examples of such infirmities below. (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
31
Section 1, 47 U.S. Code § 151, provides, in relevant part, that: "For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States … a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges … there is created a commission to be known as the ''Federal Communications Commission''…" 32 600 F.3d at 654. The Commission opened its argument by citing Section 706 as potential authority. However, because at the time of this decision the Commission still held that Section 706 did not provide it with an independent grant of authority, the court rejected this argument. 34 The Commission also relied upon Section 256, which directs the Commission to "establish procedures for ... oversight of coordinated network planning ... for the effective and efficient interconnection of public telecommunications networks." 35 However, because the court noted that Section 256 goes on to state that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as expanding ... any authority that the Commission" otherwise has under law"-which, in the court's view, was "precisely what the FCC attempted to do" in this case-the court similarly rejected the FCC's argument. 36 Finally, the court rejected the agency's attempt to use Section 257, which directs the Commission to issue a report every three years identifying barriers to entry for entrepreneurs and small businesses in the provision and ownership of telecommunications and information services. 37 While the court found that it could "readily accept that certain assertions of Commission authority [to] be 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's statutory responsibility to issue a report to Congress"-for example, the court recognized that it would be permissible for the agency to impose disclosure requirements on Broadband Service Providers in order to gather data needed for such a report-it also found that "the Commission's attempt to dictate the operation of an otherwise unregulated service based on nothing more than its obligation to issue a report defies any plausible notion of 'ancillariness.'" 38
Case Summary
So, what does Comcast tell us? At minimum, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the demise of the FCC's ancillary authority are "greatly exaggerated." To the contrary, a plausible reading of Comcast (a reading which is reinforced by the dicta contained in the two cases described below) indicates that the Commission's ancillary authority is alive and well, subject to two clear limiting conditions: First, the Commission may not assert its ancillary authority by simply relying upon statements of Congressional policy; and second, the Commission must tie the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction to a specific delegation of authority contained in Title II, 34 600 F.3d at 658-59. As noted infra, subsequent to this decision, the Commission reversed course and found that Section 706 did, in fact, provide it with a separate source of authority. Title III or Title VI 39 (a holding which is a well-established criterion of ancillary jurisdiction). 40 What Comcast did not do, however, is address the question of what are the exact boundaries of that ancillary authority vis-à-vis the imposition of common carrier obligations on Title I services. We turn to that question next.
B. Cellco Partnership v. FCC
In Cellco, the D.C. Circuit was tasked with evaluating the legality of the FCC's Data Roaming Order, under which the agency mandated mobile providers to offer data roaming agreements to other such providers on "commercially reasonable" terms. 41 While the Commission's authority for its earlier efforts to impose roaming for voice services was relatively clear under Title II, 42 the Data Roaming Order pushed the legal envelope because not only had the Commission specifically classified mobile broadband as an "information service" under Title I, 43 but under the plain terms of Section 332(c)(2) of the Communications Act, "a person engaged in the provision of a service that is a private mobile service shall not, insofar as such person is engaged, be treated as a common carrier for any purpose under this Act." 44 Accordingly, the court in Cellco was forced to resolve two legal questions: (1) did the FCC have the legal authority to issue the Data Roaming Order in the first instance?; but even if so (2) did the agency unlawfully treat mobile providers as "common carriers" in this particular case? Let's look at how the court resolved each question in turn. www.phoenix-center.org
Jurisdiction
In support of its action, the FCC identified three sources of regulatory authority for its Data Roaming Order: Title III of the Communications Act, which broadly governs the Commission's authority over radio spectrum; Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; and the Commission's ancillary authority under Title I. According to the court, however, in this particular case "we begin-and end-with Title III." 45 In particular, the court focused on the agency's use of Section 303(b), which authorizes the agency to "'[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station within any class'" 46 ; and section 303(r), which empowers the Commission, subject to the demands of the public interest, to "'[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.'" 47 While the appellants argued that the Commission's use of these sections represented "an unprecedented and unbounded theory of regulatory power over wireless Internet service under its general 'public interest' authority", the court disagreed.
First, the court noted that while Title III does not "confer an unlimited power," it does endow the Commission with "expansive powers" and a "comprehensive mandate to 'encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.'" 48 So, while the court held that the Commission may not rely on Title III's public-interest provisions without mooring its action to a distinct grant of authority in that Title (a finding consistent with the holding in Comcast, supra), in this particular case the court found that the agency's reliance on Section 303(b) was a sufficient delegation of direct authority. www.phoenix-center.org service." As such, reasoned the court, the Data Roaming Order "merely defines the form mobileinternet service must take for those who seek a license to offer it." 49 Next, the court took on the appellant's argument that the Data Roaming Order impermissibly resulted in a "fundamental change"-rather than a mere modification-of its existing licenses under Section 316 of the Communications Act. 50 While the court agreed that the Commission's Section 316 power to "modif[y] existing licenses does not enable it to fundamentally change those licenses," in the court's view, the Data Roaming Order "cannot be said to have wrought such a 'fundamental change.'" According to the court, because the Data Roaming Order "requires nothing more than the offering of 'commercially reasonable' roaming agreements, it hardly effects such a radical change." Indeed, reasoned the court, "imposing a limited obligation to offer data-roaming agreements to other mobile-data providers 'can reasonably be considered [a] modification [ ] of existing licenses.'" 51
Common Carriage
Having ruled that Title III authorized the Commission to promulgate the Data Roaming Order, the court next turned to the other central legal question of the case-did the Data Roaming Order contravene the Communications Act's prohibition against treating providers of mobile data service as common carriers? 52
The Communications Act defines "common carrier" as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire" 53 -a definition which the court found to be "unsatisfyingly circular." 54 Complicating matters, reasoned the court, was the fact that "over the years … the Commission has relaxed the duties of common carriers in certain respects, and the line between common carriers and private carriers, i.e., entities that are not common carriers, has blurred. www.phoenix-center.org Accordingly, the difficult task before the court was "to pin down the essence of common carriage in the midst of changing technology and the evolving regulatory landscape." 56
As a first step, the court reviewed the relevant case law and discerned the following three "basic principles" to guide its analysis to determine whether a BSP is acting as a "common carrier." They are as follows:
Principle No. 1: If a carrier is forced to offer service indiscriminately and on general terms, then that carrier is being relegated to common carrier status.
Principle No. 2: The Federal Communications Commission has significant latitude to determine the bounds of common carriage in particular cases.
Principle No. 3
There is an important distinction between the question of whether a given regulatory regime is consistent with common carrier status and the question of whether that regime necessarily confers common carrier status.
(Emphasis in original.) 57
While Principles Nos. 1 and 2 are rather straightforward and reflect years of administrative law precedent, it is Principle No. 3 which is the interesting holding of law. According to the court, … even if a regulatory regime is not so distinct from common carriage as to render it inconsistent with common carrier status, that hardly means it is so fundamentally common carriage as to render it inconsistent with private carrier status. In other words, common carriage is not all or nothing-there is a gray area in which although a given regulation might be applied to common carriers, the obligations imposed are not common carriage per se. It is in this realm-the space between per se common carriage and per se private carriage-that the Commission's determination that a regulation does or does not confer common carrier status warrants deference. Such is the case with the data roaming rule. 58 Having derived these principles-and, in particular, having identified a permissible "gray area"-the court then used these principles to evaluate whether the Data Roaming Order improperly imposed common carriage requirements. After review, the court found that it did not.
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Id.
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Id. at 547. In particular, the court focused on the fact that the Data Roaming Order provided substantial room for individualized bargaining and discrimination in terms by expressly permitting providers to adapt roaming agreements to "individualized circumstances without having to hold themselves out to serve all comers indiscriminately on the same or standardized terms." Given the Commission's phraseology, reasoned the court, the Data Roaming Order does "not amount to a duty to hold out facilities indifferently for public use." (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, reasoned the court, while the Data Roaming Order requires carriers to offer terms that are "commercially reasonable," the Data Roaming Order imposes no presumption of "reasonableness" (in contrast to the traditional "just and reasonable" standard under Title II); instead, the Commission will evaluate commercial reasonableness via sixteen different subjective factors plus a catch-all "other special or extenuating circumstances" factor. According to the court, because the Order provides "considerable flexibility for providers to respond to the competitive forces at play in the mobile-data market" via commercial negotiation, the Data Roaming Order does not contravene the statutory exclusion of mobile providers who provide data service from common carrier status. 59
Case Summary
After review, there are several interesting aspects of Cellco which merit further discussion. First, notwithstanding its holding in Comcast supra affirming the validity of the Commission's ancillary authority, it is interesting to note that the court in Cellco went out of its way to find a direct delegation of authority in this case: i.e., although mobile broadband is classified as a Title I service, the court permitted the Commission to regulate the service under Title III. In so doing, Cellco tells us that the FCC's decision to reclassify broadband Internet access as a Title I service does not a fortiori mean that the Commission abdicated its general jurisdiction altogether. 60 To the contrary, to the extent that Broadband Service Providers engage in some sort of activity governed by Title II, Title III or Title VI, Cellco is a plain reminder that the FCC's plenary jurisdiction over Broadband Service Providers remains very much in force. As such, we can read Cellco for the proposition that the Commission's ability to carry out its traditional core mandate (e.g., spectrum allocation, consumer protection, public safety, universal service, etc.) remains very much intact. 61
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Id. at 548. 60 See Pulver Order, supra n. 60.
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C.f., In re FCC 11-161, __ F.3d __ (10 th Cir., May 23, 2014) (upholding Commission's plan to allocate Universal Service Funds to pay for broadband, rather than traditional POTS, networks under Title II) (available at: http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-9900.pdf).
Section 706 as an Independent Grant of Authority
Section 706 is comprised of two relevant sections. Under Section 706(a),
The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment. 66 Section 706(b), in turn, requires the Commission to conduct a regular inquiry "concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability." 67 It further provides that should the Commission find that if "advanced telecommunications capability is [not] being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion," then it "shall take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market." 68 The statute defines "advanced telecommunications capability" to include "broadband telecommunications capability." 69 Turning first to Section 706(a), the court held that this provision did in fact provide the Commission with an affirmative grant of authority. In the court's view, Congress intended Section 706(a) to act as a backstop to the deregulation intended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. As the court observed, "Section 706(a)'s legislative history suggests that Congress may have, somewhat presciently, viewed that provision as an affirmative grant of authority to the Commission whose existence would become necessary if other contemplated grants of statutory authority were for some reason unavailable." 70 That said, the court was careful to point out that the Commission's authority under Section 706(a) was not unfettered. In fact, the court found that there are at least two limiting principles inherent to Section 706(a). The first limiting principle, according to the court, is that Section 706(a) "must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the Communications Act The second limiting principle, according to the court, is that "any regulations must be designed to achieve a particular purpose: to 'encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.' Section 706(a) thus gives the Commission authority to promulgate only those regulations that it establishes will fulfill this specific statutory goal…." 72 Thus dispensing with Section 706(a), the court next turned to Section 706(b). Whether Section 706(b) presented the Commission with an affrmative source of authority was a particularly intriguing question for the court because for the agency's first five Section 706 Reports, the Commission had always found that broadband was being deployed on a "reasonable and timely basis." 73 Yet, subsequent to Comcast and prior to Verizon, the Commission in its Sixth Section 706 Report suddenly decided otherwise. While the court conceded that the "timing of the Commission's timing is certainly suspicious," 74 the court upheld the Commission's use of Section 706(b) for essentially the same reason it provided for the Commission's use of Section 706(a), namely, that Congress contemplated that the Commission would regulate this industry, as the agency had in the past, and the scope of any authority granted to it by section 706(b)-limited, as it is, both by the boundaries of the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction and the requirement that any regulation be tailored to the specific statutory goal of accelerating broadband deployment-is not so Having determined that both Section 706(a) and 706(b) provide an affirmative source of authority (subject to the limitations highlighted above), the court next turned to whether the Commission properly invoked this authority. According to the court, the Commission's "virtuous cycle of investment" model was sufficient justification for the use of Section 706.
Under the FCC's "virtuous cycle of investment" model, regulations are required to "protect and promote edge-provider development for more and better broadband technologies, which in turn stimulates competition among broadband providers to further invest in broadband." 76 Stating the agency's model another way, "broadband providers' potential disruption of edgeprovider traffic to be itself the sort of 'barrier' that has 'the potential to stifle overall investment in Internet infrastructure'" and, therefore, could "limit competition in telecommunications markets." 77 In buying this argument, however, the court issued dicta which will be a point of contention in the broadband debate for some time.
For example, the court found that BSPs "represent a threat to Internet openness and could act in ways that would ultimately inhibit the speed and extent of future broadband deployment." 78 To support such a conclusion, the court found that BSPs are "motivated to discriminate against and among edge providers" who provide similar services like VoIP or video. Moreover, the court found that BSPs have "powerful incentives to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for excluding their competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users." Should such conduct occur, reasoned the court, "the resultant harms to innovation and demand will largely constitute 'negative externalities': any given broadband provider will 'receive the benefits of ... fees but [is] unlikely to fully account for the detrimental impact on edge providers' ability and incentive to innovate and invest.'" Notwithstanding the ample literature showing that such a universal conclusion is not true, 79 the court adamantly held that these potential outcomes are "based firmly in common sense and economic reality. But the court did not stop there: the court also found that BSPs "have the technical and economic ability to impose such restrictions." To support this conclusion, the court provided several rationales. First, the court found that because "all end users generally access the Internet through a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a "'terminating monopolist,' with power to act as a 'gatekeeper' with respect to edge providers that might seek to reach its end-user subscribers." 81 Second, the court found that this "terminating monopoly" was reinforced by the facts that not only do consumers have "limited" competitive options because "only one or two wireline or fixed wireless firms" provide service in most markets, 82 but that consumers face high switching costs for such services such as "early termination fees; the inconvenience of ordering, installation, and set-up, and associated deposits or fees; possible difficulty returning the earlier broadband provider's equipment and the cost of replacing incompatible customer-owned equipment; the risk of temporarily losing service; the risk of problems learning how to use the new service; and the possible loss of a provider-specific email address or website." 83 Finally, the court found that consumers may not be sufficiently sensitive to BSP conduct for competition, if it exists, to protect them from bad conduct. In the court's view:
Broadband providers' ability to impose restrictions on edge providers does not depend on their benefiting from the sort of market concentration that would enable them to impose substantial price increases on end users-which is all the Commission said in declining to make a market power finding. Rather, broadband providers' ability to impose restrictions on edge providers simply depends on end users not being fully responsive to the imposition of such restrictions. 84 Yet, oddly, in the Open Internet Order, the Commission never made an affirmative finding of market power to justify the imposition of regulation; in fact, the Commission made it expressly clear that competition plays no role in its application of net neutrality regulation. 85 In so doing,
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Id. at 646. In the same vein, the court upheld the Commission's reasoning that the "ability to act as a 'gatekeeper' distinguishes broadband providers from other participants in the Internet marketplace-including prominent and potentially powerful edge providers such as Google and Apple-who have no similar 'control [over] access to the Internet for their subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those subscribers. '" Id. 82 Noticeably, the court ignored the presence of multiple mobile broadband providers. Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit is not the only court of general jurisdiction to discount the effect of wireless substitution. See, e.g., Qwest v. FCC, 689 F.3d 1214 (10 th Cir. 2012 (upholding FCC's Phoenix Forbearance Order) .
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Id. at 646-47. 84 Id. at 648 (citations omitted). 85 See, e.g., Open Internet Order, supra n. 63 at ¶ 32 ("… these threats to Internet-enabled innovation, growth, and competition do not depend upon broadband providers having market power with respect to end users …") and (Footnote Continued….) 
Issues of Common Carriage
Having found that Section 706 provides an affirmative grant of authority to the Commission (subject to the limitations outlined above), the court next turned to the question of whether the specific rules proposed in the Open Internet Order-i.e., the anti-discrimination, the "no blocking" and the transparency requirements-constituted an impermissible imposition of common carriage requirements on Title I services. 86 Utilizing the principles detailed in Cellco, supra, the court found that the non-discrimination and anti-blocking provisions certainly did.
What is interesting is that the court appeared to focus on the fact that for both the antiblocking and non-discrimination rules, such prohibitions essentially amounted to the imposition of uniform price regulation to all comers (regardless of customer class), albeit "zero price" regulation. 87 Again, remembering from Cellco that a major element of common carriage is the requirement to carry all traffic indiscriminately (as opposed to private carriage, where the practice is to make individualized decisions about whether, and on what terms, to deal), the court found that "the Commission may not claim that the Open Internet Order imposes no common carrier obligation simply because it compels an entity to continue furnishing service at no cost." 88 For example, in determining the validity of the non-discrimination requirement the court observed that:
the Open Internet Order makes no attempt to ensure that its reasonableness standard remains flexible. Instead, with respect to broadband providers' potential negotiations with edge providers, the Order ominously declares: "it is unlikely that pay for priority would satisfy the 'no unreasonable discrimination' standard." If the Commission will likely bar broadband providers from charging edge at n. 87 ("Because broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers even in the absence of market power with respect to end users, we need not conduct a market power analysis."). 86 See 47 U.S.C. §153 (51) The court's focus on uniform "zero price" regulation applied equally to the Commission's attempt to impose an anti-blocking rule, finding that:
The anti-blocking rules establish a minimum level of service that broadband providers must furnish to all edge providers: edge providers' "content, applications [and] So, while Verizon makes clear that the Commission cannot mandate that Broadband Service Providers universally charge a uniform price to all comers (in this case a "zero" price), the court was ambiguous as to the exact contours of a standard which would pass legal muster. Although the court did hint that a Cellco-type "commercially reasonable" test might work going forward, the court suggested that the evaluation of any new rule will be contingent on "how the common carrier reasonableness standard applies in … context, not whether the standard is actually the same as the common carrier standard." 91
Finally, the court (as appellate courts often do) provided the Commission with a plausible, alternative path for an anti-blocking rule going forward. Specifically, the court hypothesized if the relevant "carriage" BSPs provide "might be access to end-users more generally"-as opposed to a "minimum required service"-then the "anti-blocking rule would permit broadband providers to distinguish somewhat among edge providers" and not result in common carriage. To illustrate this point, the court provided the following hypothetical:
For example, Verizon might, consistent with the anti-blocking rule-and again, absent the anti-discrimination rule-charge an edge provider like Netflix for high-speed, priority access while limiting all other edge providers to a more standard service. In theory, moreover, not only could Verizon negotiate separate agreements with each individual edge provider regarding the level of service provided, but it could also charge similarly-situated edge providers completely 89 Id. at 657 (citations omitted and emphasis supplied).
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Id. at 658 (emphasis supplied).
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Id. at 657 (emphasis in original). www.phoenix-center.org "shall encourage … deployment on a reasonable and timely basis" either by regulatory forbearance or by imposing additional regulation. Read alone, therefore, a reasonable interpretation would be that Section 706(a) provides the FCC with a continuing independent duty to encourage broadband deployment using the various regulatory powers delineated in that provision. Yet, we also have Section 706(b), which requires the FCC to conduct a regular inquiry and a clear mandate that if the agency finds after such inquiry that broadband is not being deployed "on a reasonable and timely basis," then it "shall take immediate action."
Clearly, at the time the Commission promulgated its original Open Internet Order, the agency believed that Section 706(b) was required to trigger the use of its authority in 706(a) given the fact that the Commission decided-(in the court's words) "suspicious[ly]"-post-Comcast and pre-Verizon to find in its Sixth 706 Report that broadband was no longer being deployed on a reasonable and timely basis. This view of Section 706 is reasonable given that it is a "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words in a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." 96 However, if the Commission's original reading of Section 706 was accurate, then the Achilles heel of the legal theory is exposed-i.e., what one Commission finds to be "reasonable and timely" in one Section 706 Report, the next Commission can find differently later.
Yet, for whatever reason, the court never looked at how the agency defined the terms "reasonable and timely" for either Section 706(a) and 706(b). (Had it done so, given the Commission's naked gerrymandering of its own cost data, we probably would have been looking at a different result. 97 ) Instead, the court reasoned that because BSPs-as "terminating monopolists"-always have both the incentive and ability to discriminate, absent regulation BSPs will always adversely affect the virtuous cycle of investment. In so doing, we can infer that the court takes the view that 706(a) is independent from 706(b), because the court seemed to say that the defined trigger of Section 706(b) is irrelevant to the Commission's on-going (and independent) effort to promote broadband deployment under 706(a) under foreseeable market conditions. If this is the correct reading of Verizon, however, then the implications are significant.
To start, a "virtuous cycle", by definition, has no beginning or end. Thus, by endorsing the FCC's "virtuous cycle of innovation" hypothesis and ignoring the "reasonability" (i.e., cost of 96 See. e.g., Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) . www.phoenix-center.org telecommunications market" via a variety of tools, including "other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment." The question at hand, therefore, is whether there are limits to that authority? According to Verizon, the answer is yes.
In particular, Verizon makes clear that Section 706 does not provide the FCC with a direct delegation of authority. To the contrary and as noted above, Verizon holds that Section 706 is really another form of the Commission's ancillary authority-that is, like any use of its traditional ancillary authority (see discussion of Comcast supra), Verizon requires the Commission to tie its use of Section 706 to a specific delegation of authority in Title II, Title III or Title VI. And, on top of that, the Commission must also find that its actions are designed to promote additional broadband investment (a requirement, as demonstrated herein, is a bit squishier). These limitations can be meaningful. For example, Verizon's requirement that the Commission tie its use of Section 706 to a specific delegation of authority probably prevents the Commission from extending its regulation to stand-alone edge providers who are not otherwise engaged in jurisdictional activities as some fear (although an aggressive Commission could certainly try). 103 Similarly, Verizon's requirement that the Commission tie its use of Section 706 to a specific delegation of authority probably does not enhance the Commission's ability to preempt state laws restricting municipal broadband deployment. 104
III. Conclusion
In this paper, I seek to answer a straightforward legal question: what are the bounds of the FCC's authority over Broadband Service Providers? Based on the three cases I reviewed here, it is clear that the FCC retains ample jurisdiction over Broadband Service Providers under current law and, as such, reclassification of broadband Internet access as a Title II common carrier telecommunications service is unwarranted. Indeed, the three recent cases reviewed in this BULLETIN focused directly on the agency's authority and made a number of significant determinations.
First, where applicable, these cases hold that Broadband Service Providers are still subject to direct jurisdiction under Title II, Title III and Title VI; hence, the FCC's decision to classify broadband Internet access as a Title I information service does not a fortiori mean that the Commission has abdicated its authority over Broadband Service Providers altogether. To the
